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It is highly appropriate that the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies has 
chosen a conference topic relating to the interaction of financial market and macro-
economic phenomena in a setting with very low interest rates, with special con-
sideration given to recent experience in Japan. In studying this topic, as with most issues
relating to policy, it is important to make use of structural models designed to mimic
the behavior of real-world agents and markets. Accordingly, there needs to be some
agreement about the nature of the relevant monetary and macroeconomic framework,
as well as the nature of the Japanese experience. 
There has been much progress during the past few years in the economics 
profession’s understanding of the zero-lower-bound (ZLB) constraint on nominal
interest rates and its implications for the conduct of monetary policy. Recent work 
by Auerbach and Obstfeld (2003, 2004), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003, 2004),
Svensson (2001, 2003), Iwamoto (2005), Baba et al. (2005), Fujiwara et al. (2005),
Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2005), and others has been noteworthy and 
constructive in this respect. There are still a few impressions, however, that seem to
me to be rather widely held and yet somewhat misleading. My talk will be about
these. It will draw upon useful recent overview papers by Bernanke and Reinhart
(2004) and Ueda (2005). I will not be offering any fundamentally new theoretical
results, but will try to mention some points that might be of relevance in interpreting
the experience of the past decade in Japan. 
The main objective will be to argue that all of the following propositions are
invalid or at least dubious: (1) in a ZLB situation, “shaping interest rate expectations
is essentially the only tool that central bankers have” (Bernanke, Reinhart, and 
Sack [2004]); (2) fiscal policy actions such as “helicopter drops” are in theory more
effective than monetary policy actions; (3) the prominent “foolproof way” (FPW)
policy rule of Svensson (2001, 2003) is applicable more generally—that is, even
when exact uncovered interest parity (UIP) holds—than the alternative exchange 
rate policy rule of McCallum (2000); (4) both of the exchange rate strategies
described in (3) are open to the objection that they constitute “beggar-thy-neighbor”
approaches; and (5) there is a significant danger of ZLB difficulties stemming from 
a “deflationary trap” type of equilibrium, as distinct from a situation involving a 
“liquidity trap.” These five topics will be discussed in Sections II–VI, with Section
VII providing a brief conclusion.
II. Monetary Policy Stimulus at the ZLB?
For discussion of currently prevailing views regarding monetary policy at the ZLB, 
I will take as representative the recent overview paper of Bernanke and Reinhart
(2004). This choice is warranted not only because the authors are leading policy-
makers for the Federal Reserve—even more so now than in 2004 when the paper was
presented!—but also because Bernanke has written on the topic earlier (Bernanke
[2000]) and because the Bernanke-Reinhart paper has been treated as indicative of 
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policymaking process at the Bank of Japan during much of the ZLB episode. In their
paper, Bernanke and Reinhart (2004, p. 85) “discuss three strategies for stimulating
the economy at an unchanged level of the policy rate.” Their list includes (a) shaping
interest rate expectations, (b) altering the composition of the central bank’s balance
sheet, and (c) expanding the size of the central bank’s balance sheet. The first of these
is the approach featured by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003, 2004), who develop an
irrelevance proposition for open market purchases according to which “quantitative
easing” is to no avail. Instead, “the key to effective central-bank action to combat a
deflationary slump is the management of expectations” (2003, p. 8). At face value, this
proposition seems to contradict results by Auerbach and Obstfeld (2003, 2004),
Coenen and Wieland (2003), and others who find a role for open market purchases
of “unconventional” assets.
1 It will be argued below, however, that there is no actual
theoretical inconsistency; that the different papers presume different types of policy
experiments. Eggertsson and Woodford (henceforth, E&W) have argued that the
crucial distinction is whether or not the policy experiment considered involves a 
permanent change in some nominal variable. In that spirit, it will be shown below
that if there is a credible rule change that, for example, increases the target inflation
rate, then monetary policy can be effective in bringing an economy out of a ZLB 
situation even under the E&W assumptions.
The exact nature of the E&W result deserves attention. It involves analysis of 
the stabilization properties of an interest rate policy regime that is specified to incor-
porate “quantitative easing.” That term is taken by E&W (2003) to mean that the
monetary base supply function, which implements their interest rate rule with given
money demand behavior, includes an unusual nonlinear component that calls for
extra open market purchases whenever the interest rate is zero. These purchases are
immediately reversed, however, as soon as the interest rate rises above zero (the
interest rate in question, here denoted Rt, is “the riskless nominal interest rate on
one-period obligations” from E&W [2003, p. 10]). One could simply view this 
supply function as a policy rule for the monetary base, recognize the base money
stock as a variable, and solve the model in a standard and familiar fashion, if it were
not for the nonlinear component and the associated restriction that the interest rate
must be non-negative.
2 What E&W do with the resulting model is to show that the
behavior of prices and output in the model’s rational expectations (RE) equilibrium 
is independent of any parameters that describe the quantitative easing component 
of the base supply rule. Whatever the extent of the additional base-money supply
specified by this component, then, there will be no effect on inflation or output in
the RE equilibrium. That is the E&W irrelevance proposition. Note, crucially, that it
pertains to the nature of a single ongoing RE equilibrium for a given policy rule that
involves certain specified behavior when the ZLB is operative, not to the adoption of
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1. Assets, that is, that are not perfect substitutes for the short-term security that is normally used in open market oper-
ations. The Bernanke-Reinhart list does not include Goodfriend’s (2000, pp. 1013–1018) suggestion of institutional
changes to eliminate the ZLB.
2. The model used by E&W is rather standard, relative to the recent monetary policy literature, but is slightly more
“monetarist” than is usual in that the utility function, which includes real money balances as an argument, is not
assumed to be separable.a new rule. The irrelevance proposition is perhaps unsurprising, given that any “extra”
base money supplied (when Rt = 0) is removed immediately, as soon asRt > 0.
3
It is, I believe, somewhat misleading for the E&W analysis to be described in terms
of shaping interest rate expectations; instead, it is expectations of future values more
generally—not just interest rates—that matter. In particular, expectations regarding
future monetary aggregates or price levels could alternatively be made the focus of
expectations management. Svensson (2004) develops this point very effectively. 
To emphasize the importance of policy rule changes that pertain to features of the
rule other than the special nonlinear component, let us briefly discuss an extremely
simplified example based on the following two-equation system, which is so familiar
as to require only a brief explanation at this point:
4
yt = b0 +b1(Rt –Et pt+1) +Etyt+1 +vt, b1 < 0, (1)
Rt =  0 +  pt + 1( pt – 
*) +  2yt,  1 > 0,  2 ≥ 0. (2)
Here yt and pt denote the logs of an output variable and the price level so that  pt is
inflation while Rt is the one-period nominal interest rate. The term vt represents a 
preference shock that is generated by an exogenous stochastic process, which is
assumed to be autoregressive of order one with parameter  ,  < 1. Equation (2) is 
a Taylor-style rule in which the central bank is depicted as setting an interest rate
instrument Rt each period so as to tighten policy when inflation exceeds its target 
value  
* and/or when output is high. In (1) and (2), yt should be interpreted as the 
output gap with the natural rate of output assumed constant at the value zero. With
flexible prices, we then have yt = 0 in each period and there are only two endogenous
variables to be determined by the system, Rt and  pt. This model should be under-
stood to also include the requirement that  pt must not approach –  as t →  ,
because of a transversality condition that obtains in the underlying optimizing model.
To obtain an RE solution in the absence of any ZLB constraint, we first substitute
out Rt, use yt = 0, and assume that the central bank sensibly sets  0 to equal the 
long-run real rate of interest r = –b0/b1. Then the relevant solution is
5
 pt =  
* − [b1(1 −  + 1)]
−1vt. (3)
When the constraint Rt ≥ 0 is included, (3) is not in general the solution, but it will
be (to a suitable approximation) if vt has bounded support and the target inflation
rate  
* is large enough relative to r. Then suppose that the economy is initially in 
a ZLB situation, but the central bank adopts a new policy rule such that  
* is 
sufficiently high so that the ZLB will never be binding in the future. In that case, 
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3. It is my impression that proponents of quantitative easing for Japan have almost invariably had in mind a new 
policy that, among other features, would entail a target inflation rate that is higher than values experienced in
Japan during the ZLB episode—and certainly high enough to imply a positive steady-state interest rate on
overnight bank loans. Thus, their recommendations would have implied a change in the policy rule.
4. The present system differs from the model of E&W, but without the quantitative easing feature, primarily by
positing flexible prices, which is irrelevant to the point at issue.
5. See McCallum (2005, pp. 5–6), plus the discussion in Section VI below.the new RE equilibrium will yield immediately an inflation rate high enough to
escape the ZLB situation. Of course, it is rather implausible that such a new policy
rule would be credible immediately, but that is another issue that we will touch upon
below. The point here is to illustrate the major difference between a change in the
inflation target, on the one hand, and a change in a parameter such as  1 in (2). 
The latter type of change would typically be ineffective in a ZLB situation because 
of the constraint that prevents any reduction in Rt. This latter type of change is, in
effect, what is being shown to be useless by the E&W policy irrelevance proposition.
With respect to Bernanke and Reinhart’s (2004) strategy type (c), expanding the
size of the central bank’s balance sheet via open market purchases, I would like to
comment on their identification of this category with the term “quantitative easing.”
It is my impression that the latter term was introduced in the context of the Japanese
experience, and with respect to proposals made by critics of the Bank of Japan’s actual
policy including, for example, Goodfriend (1997), Taylor (1997), Meltzer (1999a),
and (especially) Nakahara.
6 It is my further impression that these individuals had 
in mind money creation together with the purchase of nonstandard assets, so that
their proposals actually amounted to applications of strategies (b) and (c) together.
By the late 1990s, it was widely understood that open market purchases of short-
term government bills would have no expansionary impact, as these assets become
near-perfect substitutes for base money when an economy is in a ZLB situation. 
In addition, I believe that they intended that the Bank of Japan also make public a
commitment to conduct policy so as to avoid deflation, in both the present and the
future.
7 Thus, their proposals might be interpreted as implying rule changes of the
type discussed above, which (if credible) would in theory have been effective (via
strategy [a]). The extent to which the large expansion of the Bank of Japan’s balance
sheet during 1999–2005 met these proposals is a matter of continuing discussion. 
III. Fiscal Transfers
Some analysts (e.g., Ball [2005]) have suggested that a “helicopter drop” type of 
policy, in which transfers of money are given to the public in a lump-sum fashion,
would be more effective than nonfiscal monetary policy actions for escaping a ZLB
situation. Is this position in fact supported by formal analysis? Here I argue very
briefly that such a policy would be ineffective if the economy possesses Ricardian
properties, as in the case of the canonical model used by E&W (2003) and many
others. The first step of the argument is as follows.
A “helicopter drop” is a transfer (gift) of money to households. In this regard, note
that a transfer of $K is equivalent to the combination of two operations, namely, 
(1) a lump-sum tax reduction of $K financed by the sale of $K of T-bills to households
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6. Nobuyuki Nakahara served on the Bank of Japan’s Policy Board through much of the episode and offered many
proposals at the Bank’s Monetary Policy Meetings, almost all of which were voted down.
7. See, for example, Goodfriend (1997, p. 294) and Meltzer (1999a, p. 190). The proposals of Goodfriend and Taylor
were presented at the seventh International Conference held in October 1995 by the Institute for Monetary and
Economic Studies of the Bank of Japan.(i.e., a gift of $K of T-bills to households), and (2) an open market purchase of 
$K worth of T-bills. But it is well known that an operation of type (1) has no effect if
the economy is Ricardian and also that one of type (2) has no effect at the ZLB (where
base money and T-bills are perfect substitutes at the margin). Thus, the combined
operation—the helicopter drop—will have no effect in the ZLB situation.
The second part of the argument pertains to a sequence of such operations. Would
not an ongoing sequence of helicopter drops violate a transversality condition if there
were no inflationary effect, since the nominal money stock would be growing without
bound in the proposed experiment? Well, yes, it would if the ZLB situation were to 
go on forever. But analysis of ZLB issues typically pertains to situations in which an
economy, assumed to have a positive steady-state nominal interest rate, is temporarily
at the ZLB as the result of some negative shock.
8 In such cases, the economy will escape
the ZLB of its own accord at some point in the finite future, after which time pt
will tend to grow in line with mt, the log of the money stock. So, since transversality
conditions pertain only to the infinitely distant future, they are not relevant to the
question at hand. 
Of course, the foregoing analysis does not deny that one could obtain effects from
repeated helicopter drops by using a non-Ricardian model, such as the overlapping-
generations model considered in McCallum (2000, pp. 876–880). Also, the argument
presumes, perhaps incorrectly, that the T-bills under discussion do not provide “broad
liquidity” services, of the type mentioned by Goodfriend (2000, pp. 1018–1028). 
IV. The Exchange Rate Channel
In a conference paper of 1999 (McCallum [2000]), I proposed a strategy whereby 
central banks can avoid policy impotence at the ZLB via purchases of foreign
exchange by using the exchange rate in place of the usual overnight interest rate as
the policy instrument/indicator variable. My paper argued, by means of simulations
with a quantitative model, that a policy rule for setting the exchange rate’s rate of
depreciation, in response to inflation and output deviations from target values, could
provide macroeconomic stabilization even if the interest rate were immobilized at zero.
Subsequently, Svensson (2001) put forth a closely related proposal—which he called
the “foolproof way” (FPW)—involving the exchange rate transmission channel.
Svensson’s presentation was evidently much more effective than mine, as his paper has
attracted a good bit of attention whereas mine is mentioned rather infrequently.
Svensson (2001, p. 298) has explicitly recognized the close kinship of our two pro-
posals, but has stated that his argument “does not depend on any portfolio-balance
effects of foreign-exchange interventions, in contrast to the argument of Meltzer
(1999d) and McCallum (1999), and thus, it is more general.”
9 It is my contention,
however, that our two policy rules are equally open to the objection—an objection
that I consider inappropriate—that they rely on portfolio-balance effects. Instead, 
the policy rules evidently rely upon departures from pure UIP to exactly the same
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8. Justification for this practice is discussed in Section VI below.
9. The papers cited are listed in the references below as Meltzer (1999b) and McCallum (2000).extent; the main difference in the two proposals being that one is concerned with a shift
in policy while the other involves the effectiveness of one ongoing rule.
To make this argument, let us consider the following model of a small open econ-
omy. This model, developed by McCallum and Nelson (1999), differs (inessentially)
from most small-scale optimizing models by treating imports as raw materials used in
the production process rather than consumer goods that differ from the bundle of
domestically produced goods. It can be summarized with the following 10 equations,
in which st is the log of the home-country price of foreign exchange:
ct =Etct+1 +b0 −b1rt +vt, b1 < 0, (4)
yt =  1ct + 2gt +  3xt,0   < 1, 2, 3 < 1,(5)
qt = st −pt +pt
F, (6)
imt = yt − qt +const,   > 0, (7)
xt = yt
F + 
Fqt +const,  
F > 0, (8)
yt – = (1 − 2)
−1[ 1at −  2qt] +const,0   <  2 < 1, (9)
 pt = (1+ )
−1[ Et pt+1+ pt−1]+ (yt −yt –)+ut,   > 0, 0 < < 1, (10)
Rt −Rt
F =Et st+1 + t, (11)
rt = Rt −Et pt+1, (12)
Rt = r + pt + 1( pt − 
*) + 2(yt − yt –)+  t,  1,  2 ≥ 0. (13)
A very brief description of each of these relationships will be provided. Equation (4)
is a consumption (ct) Euler equation, reflecting intertemporal optimization, while 
(5) is a log-linear approximation to an identity that splits units of output yt—not
value added—into three components reflecting uses: consumption, government 
consumption gt, and exports xt.
10 Equation (6) defines the log of the real exchange
rate qt in relation to the log of the nominal exchange rate st and the logs of home 
and foreign price levels, pt and pt
F. Next, in (7) import demand imt is given by cost
minimization for a production function of the CES type with   as the elasticity of
substitution between imports and labor. An analogous relation (8) governs demand
from abroad for home-country exports. Equation (9) specifies the natural rate (i.e.,
flexible-price) value of the log of real output, yt –, with this value depending upon 
a stochastic term at that reflects the results of technology shocks (assumed to follow
an exogenous AR(1) process with autocorrelation parameter 0.95) and the real price
of imported inputs to production. A variant of the Calvo model of nominal price
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10. That yt reflects units of output, not value added, is apparent from the production function used in (7) and approx-
imated in (9). Domestic investment would also be included in a model that distinguishes between consumption
and investment spending. In the model, all variables except interest rates are logs of the underlying measures.stickiness appears as (10) while (11) represents UIP, with a stochastic disturbance.
Finally, (12) is the Fisher identity that defines the one-period real rate of interest rt in
relation to the nominal rate Rt and expected inflation.
Together with the Taylor-style policy rule (13), this model provides 10 structural
equations to generate values of the system’s 10 endogenous variables, namely, ct, yt, gt, xt,
imt, pt,st,qt,Rt, andrt. Now suppose that the interest rate instrumentRt is immobilized
at the ZLB and thus is constant over time. In such a case, McCallum (2000) suggests
that the central bank use as its instrument the exchange rate, with a rule such as
st −st−1 =  q + pt − 1( pt − 
*) − 2(yt − yt –) −et,  1,  2 ≥ 0, (13′)
where  q is the average rate of depreciation of the real exchange rate. This policy rule
calls for purchases or sales in the foreign exchange market, rather than the overnight
interbank market, when macroeconomic conditions call for a loosening or tightening
of policy. In my paper, I presented simulations indicating that such a rule would be
effective in stabilizing inflation and/or output relative to their target values, despite
the immobilization of the interest rate.
Note, however, that if we assume that Rt continues to equal zero in each period, the
system becomes overdetermined when (13′) is included (or when [13] is included).
Accordingly, in the simulations I ignored the UIP condition (11). The justification for
this step is explained below. But the point at hand is that exactly the same issue arises
if instead of (13′) we adopt the policy rule of Svensson’s FPW strategy, say,
st =s
fpw + t, (13′′)
where   is the specified rate of depreciation and t indexes the passage of time, while
s
fpw is a start-up value. In that case, if Rt = 0 is maintained, the system becomes
overdetermined unless some equation from (4)–(12) is dropped or some other
endogenous variable is recognized. But Svensson (2001, p. 297) states that applica-
tion of the FPW would have the central bank raising Rt above the ZLB to “a level
corresponding to uncovered interest parity.” In his scenario, this jump occurs
promptly and there is no overdetermination because Rt = 0 is not maintained. Thus,
the crucial difference in Svensson’s argument and mine is that he discusses the effects
of a rule change that immediately eliminates the liquidity trap, whereas my discussion
pertains to the performance of an ongoing rule under the constraint of an immobi-
lized interest rate. If my rule were adopted anew, it could and should be designed to
imply (if instantly credible) a jump in conditions that would end the Rt = 0 episode,
just as in the case of the FPW. Then the UIP condition could be retained in the
analysis, if the analyst believed it to be realistic.
11
Thus, we see that my analysis involves the workings of an ongoing policy rule
whereas Svensson’s featured the adoption of a new rule, with the two rules designed
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11. It appears that the distinction between “foreign exchange interventions” and commitments to buy and sell foreign
exchange at a stated price, mentioned in several places by Svensson (2001), is not pertinent. The latter method 
of implementation could be used with my rule (13′) just as with the FPW, even if the quoted price is varied from
period to period in response to current conditions (rather than growing steadily). to exploit the same transmission mechanism, working through the foreign exchange
rate. Since a major objective in each case was to argue that Japan could use this
mechanism to improve macroeconomic conditions, it is clear why Svensson chose as
he did. What then, was the reason for my choice? In fact, my choice was predicated
on the belief that use of the RE condition is much more appropriate for the analysis
of ongoing policy regimes than for the analysis of paths resulting from changes in a
policy rule. It seems unlikely, that is, that any policy rule change will immediately be
known about, believed, and understood, which is the implicit assumption for the 
latter type of exercise. In this respect, my practice was consistent with the position of
Lucas (1980).
12
To complete this discussion, let us briefly consider whether the E&W irrelevance
proposition applies to a case in which the policy rule (13′) is maintained by the 
central bank in a ZLB situation. In this context, it does matter whether pure UIP
prevails, or instead equation (11) in the foregoing model needs to be modified to 
represent some type of portfolio-balance effect. This can be done by assuming that
the disturbance  t in (11) is not exogenous, but instead is related to the relative
amounts of outside domestic and foreign nominal liabilities outstanding as in 
 t = [Bt − (Bt
F +st)] + t,
where Bt and Bt
F are logs of domestic and foreign government debt (including base
money) and  t is exogenous. Substituting and recognizing that lags could be involved,
we then write
Rt −Rt
F =(Etst+1 −st) + (L)[Bt −Bt
F −st] + t, (11′)
to replace (11). (Here  (L) is a polynomial in the lag operator.) With this adjustment,
the model features additional state variables, relative to the case in which pure 




An objection to both of the proposals discussed in the foregoing section, raised by
several commentators, is that use of the exchange rate transmission channel would
probably be highly unpopular with nations that constitute the relevant country’s
trading partners, since exchange rate depreciation would improve its trade balance
and thereby reduce the country’s imports from its trading partners.
14 For this reason,
such strategies have been said to rely upon “beggar-thy-neighbor” effects that are
globally undesirable and politically objectionable. The premise of this argument is
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12. In McCallum (2005), I modify the rule to make it effective in normal circumstances, as well as in a ZLB situation.
13. For additional discussion of the specification (11′), see the Appendix.
14. This frequently heard objection is studied by Coenen and Wieland (2003) and mentioned (without endorsement)
by Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004).highly dubious, however, for a successful anti-ZLB policy will prevent a decline or
stagnation in a country’s real income level, which is the most important determinant
of its imports. Furthermore, the exchange rate responses induced by a policy rule
such as (13′) above pertain to nominal exchange rates and will have only temporary
real effects, other than those working through income, if the rule is effective in 
stimulating demand. Quantitative simulation results exemplifying this claim are
reported as a major feature of McCallum (2003, pp. 16–23) for an expansionary
increase in the target inflation rate  
*, with policy being conducted via the exchange
rate rule (13′).
15 Svensson (2003, pp. 163–164) also discusses this point. In a more
recent contribution, he develops an argument indicating that use of the exchange rate
transmission channel will not have different import-export effects than any other
monetary policy action, for the same degree of demand stimulus (Svensson [2004,
pp. 91–92]). In sum, the “beggar-thy-neighbor” objection to use of the exchange rate
channel to escape ZLB difficulties seems to be fundamentally unjustified. 
VI. The Deflationary Trap
Finally, I turn to the topic of the “deflationary trap” possibility, extensively discussed 
by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe in a series of papers including Benhabib,
Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001, 2002). In this series, these authors have suggested
that a ZLB situation could arise for reasons quite different from those presumed above.
In the analyses of Krugman (1998), E&W (2003, 2004), Auerbach and Obstfeld
(2004), Coenen and Wieland (2003), and most other writers on the ZLB issue, it is
assumed that the relevant RE solution is one in which inflation normally fluctuates
around the target value specified by a standard, Taylor-style, interest rate policy rule.
The discussions of Iwamoto (2005) and Fujiwaraet al. (2005), however, consider as well
the possibility of a deflationary-trap equilibrium. An example taken from McCallum
(2002) that assumes flexible prices and abstracts from stochastic shocks is given in
Figure 1. There the dark upward-sloping line has slope 1 +  1, representing rule (13)
above, and the usual equilibrium is at this line’s intersection with the 45-degree line
(e.g., at 
* in Figure 1). If the target inflation rate ( 
*) plus the steady-state real rate of
interest (r) is a moderately high value, such as 4–5 percent per year, unusually large
shocks would then be required to push the system away from the  
* equilibrium to the
vicinity of the ZLB for Rt, where inflation  pt equals −r. In contrast, Benhabib,
Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe suggest that there are multiple RE equilibria and the 
relevant one may instead approach or be located at point A, even in the absence of
shocks. It is true that the latter pattern satisfies the first-order conditions for optimality,
and also the relevant transversality condition. Nevertheless, my position, argued most
extensively in McCallum (2002), is that this ZLB equilibrium is not plausible, because
it fails to be E-stable in the sense developed by Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Such a
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15. Partially contradictory results are briefly reported by Coenen and Wieland (2003), but their policy experiment 
is quite different (with no policy response until after the ZLB constraint has been in effect for 10 quarters). 
In addition, their model’s treatment of trade flows is somewhat problematic, as it does not recognize distinct
import and export quantities.failure implies that this (apparent) RE equilibrium would not belearnable in a setting
that recognizes that individual agents are not miraculously endowed with knowledge
of the economy’s parameters, but need to learn about them over time by observation of
the economy’s behavior. The usual RE equilibrium, focused upon by the other papers
mentioned above, is by contrast E-stable and learnable under standard assumptions.
16
On the basis of this contrast, I would argue that the usual RE equilibrium is the only
one of these two candidates that is plausible as a description of the behavior of an actual
economy, so that it is highly unlikely that a ZLB situation would develop unless 
monetary policy lets  
*+r fall too close to zero.
17
VII. Conclusion
Let me conclude with a very brief summary. This paper argues that, in contrast with
the beliefs of some analysts, (1) there are strategies for escaping ZLB situations other
than “shaping interest rate expectations”; (2) fiscal transfers are in theory no more
effective than open market monetary policy actions under assumptions implying
Ricardian equivalence; (3) the difference between Svensson’s (2001) FPW rule and
the exchange rate policy rule of McCallum (2000) does not involve assumptions con-
cerning UIP, but rather the type of policy experiment considered; (4) it is likely that
neither of the exchange rate strategies in (3) would lead to “beggar-thy-neighbor”
effects; and (5) the deflationary-trap type of ZLB equilibria are much less plausible
than those of the liquidity-trap type. 
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16. It should be noted that this argument regards the form of (least squares) learnability in question as a necessary,
not sufficient, condition for plausibility. In particular, it emphasizes that the relevant learning process assumes
that (1) agents collect an ever-increasing number of observations on all relevant variables while (2) the system’s
structure remains unchanged. Furthermore, (3) the agents estimate the relevant unknown parameters with an
appropriate estimator in (4) a properly specified model. Thus, if a proposed RE solution is not learnable by the
process in question, it would seem distinctly implausible that it could prevail in practice. 
17. This conclusion is basically consistent with that of Woodford (2003, pp. 123–129), although the latter’s argument
is expressed rather differently.Auerbach, A. J., and M. Obstfeld, “The Case for Open-Market Purchases in a Liquidity Trap,” NBER
Working Paper No. 9814, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003.
———, “Monetary and Fiscal Remedies for Deflation,” American Economic Review, Papers and
Proceedings, 94 (2), 2004, pp. 71–79.
Baba, N., S. Nishioka, N. Oda, M. Shirakawa, K. Ueda, and H. Ugai, “Japan’s Deflation, Problems in
the Financial System, and Monetary Policy,” Monetary and Economic Studies, 23 (1), Institute for
Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, 2005, pp. 47–111. 
Ball, L., “Fiscal Remedies for Japan’s Slump,” NBER Working Paper No. 11374, National Bureau of
Economic Research, 2005. 
Benhabib, J., S. Schmitt-Grohé, and M. Uribe, “The Perils of Taylor Rules,”Journal of Economic Theory,
96 (1–2), 2001, pp. 40–69.
———, ———, and ———, “Avoiding Liquidity Traps,” Journal of Political Economy, 110 (3), 2002,
pp. 535–563.
Bernanke, B. S., “Japanese Monetary Policy: A Case of Self-Induced Paralysis?” in R. Mikitani and A. S.
Posen, eds. Japan’s Financial Crisis and Its Parallels to U.S. Experience, Washington, D.C.:
Institute for International Economics, 2000.
———, and V. R. Reinhart, “Conducting Monetary Policy at Very Low Short-Term Interest Rates,”
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 94 (2), 2004, pp. 85–90.
———, ———, and B. P. Sack, “Monetary Policy Alternatives at the Zero Bound: An Empirical
Assessment,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 2004, pp. 1–78.
APPENDIX: THE MODIFIED UIP EQUATION
Here we are concerned with the modified UIP equation (11′), which was introduced
in Section IV. Note that (11′) is similar to equations prominent in several older 
writings by Dornbusch (e.g., Dornbusch [1987, p. 7]) and others. These represented 
a “portfolio balance” approach that was initially prominent but waned in influence as
a result of empirical studies that failed to find empirical support. Nevertheless, it is, 
I would argue, implausible to believe that no such relation obtains in fact, not even
with weak or transitory effects of the Bt −Bt
F variable. Interestingly, models of this type
have quite recently been utilized by several leading researchers,
18 while Mussa (2000)
has recognized that the absence of any effect of the type hypothesized—that is, the
absence of Bt − Bt
F—implies that a nation can enrich itself to an unlimited extent 
by printing money and buying up foreign assets. The point is that if a relation such 
as (11′) does prevail, then our simulation procedure in Section IV is theoretically
appropriate, since (11′) indicates that even with Rt = 0, st can be affected by central
bank purchases of foreign exchange because they alter the value of Bt − Bt
F.
Nevertheless, the precise specification of relation (11′) need not be known, and the
relation need not be included in the model, for basically the same reason that 
money demand functions are not needed in standard analyses which presume use of an
interest rate instrument. Thus, appending (11′) to the model would have no effect on
the implied behavior of  pt, xt, yt, or  st; it would merely specify the magnitude of
open market purchases of foreign exchange needed to implement the policy rule (13′).
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18. Essentially the same relation as (11′) has recently been central to the analyses of Flood and Marion (2000), Flood
and Jeanne (2005), and Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2005). Microeconomic support is provided by Jeanne and
Rose (2002), and the prominent work of Evans and Lyons (e.g., Evans and Lyons [2002]) is indirectly supportive.
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